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The turn of the twentieth century radically renewed industrial organization across the
United States. Early American corporations -- centralized manufacturing hubs with journeymen
and apprentices laboring under one roof -- were seldom prepared for the transformations that
scientific management and structural reorganization would bring to social relations. At the helm
of World War 1, DuPont became the epitome of broader national restructuring. Through a close
relationship with American military industries and legislatures, the DuPont brothers came to
represent Business as an inseparable component of the State. While labor historiography has
primarily focused on organizers’ relationship with regulators, important segments of its inverse - the relationship between Industry and lawmakers -- have been ignored. In the history of
DuPont’s growth lies the story of American labor’s disintegration and the organized dismantling
of the civil rights campaigns. The reasons for the supposed failure of American workers to build
a mass socialist party cannot be discovered in the structures of accumulation or labor markets
alone, but in the insinuation of industrial change into the total sphere of American life. This
paper dissects the evolution of DuPont along with American labor. The important question is
why and how a corporate-state came to possess such a pervasive and socially dominant nature.
DuPont is the ideal case study to analyze how capitalism transformed and joined American
politicians in suppressing labor movements, writing policy, and engineering social attitudes
between 1902 and 1917.

DuPont and New Corporatism
In the late 19th century, railroads simultaneously transformed the geography of the
American frontier and its organizational potential. Thirty years after the transportation
revolution, DuPont drew on their corporate developments to build an organizational behemoth
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that would inspire the majority of big business throughout the 20th century. The corporate
managers who took over DuPont in 1902 entered a family business that had previously been
operated through a loose network of firms, with a central figure delegating responsibilities to all
factory employees. Upon restructuring, DuPont integrated ideas of scientific management into
their bureaucratic organization. Vertical integration pushed for the development of an
administrative middle-class, new accounting methods, and further segmented labor markets.
With these innovations, the visible hand of management replaced the invisible hand of markets
in regulating economic activity.
Most economic activity throughout America’s 19th century rested corporate control in a
quintessential patriarch. After narrowly escaping the guillotine during the Reign of Terror, Pierre
Samuel du Pont and his son, Eleuthere Irenee du Pont moved to the United States. 1 Eleuthere,
disappointed with the quality of gunpowder in the new country, decided to start a gunpowder
mill near the Brandywine, in Delaware. 2 E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Gunpowder was incorporated
in 1802; a year later, Eleuthere fulfilled his first government contract. 3 Once a president of
DuPont died, the firm would be passed down to the most competent descendant. Constant
succession struggles throughout the 19th century made sure that the firm would continue
operating as a family business; the company would continue to run under this model for almost
100 years. 4
Workers played an integral role in the organization and operation of the firm throughout
its early existence. All of the early mills were operated via a coordinated labor effort. In 1804,

1

William H. A. Carr, The DuPonts of Delaware. New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1964, 23.
Ibid., 56.
3 Ibid., 68.
4 Gerard Colby Zilg, Du Pont: Behind the Nylon Curtain. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, Inc.,
1974, 91.
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two foremen appointed by Eleuthere oversaw the production of 44,000 pounds of black
gunpowder. 5 Since all DuPont employees lived and worked in a company town, the workers
were closely tied to their employer. When a typhoid epidemic broke out among children of du
Pont powder men in 1865, the president hired two physicians to care for the children and
silenced the powder yard whistle, so they could sleep better. 6 The number of salaried managers
to oversee workers on the mill remained small. Owners managed and the managers owned. This
relationship would remain until the 20th century.
In the 1870s, the new administration of railroads would create serious changes in
business organization. The railroad industry was the first to be administered through extensive
hierarchies and the first to compete in a modern oligopolistic manner. Nearly all American
railroads were single-track lines, continuously delivering goods throughout the country. To
assure fast, regular, and carefully scheduled movement of a wide variety of goods shipped from
hundreds of locations, railroad managers designed a line-and-staff system of administration. The
managers responsible for the movement of trains were the line officers, acting on the line of
authority running from the president to the general manager, to the general superintendent, to the
division superintendent. 7 To prevent what railroad managers saw as ruinous competition, the
largest firm formed regional federations such as the Southern Railway & Steamship Association
in 1875, and the Eastern Trunk Line Association, in 1877. 8 The cartels started to pool and divide
profits according to an agreed upon ratio. These particular changes served as a blueprint for the
business that followed.

5

Ibid., 75.
Carr, The Du Ponts of Delaware, 207.
7 Richard C. Edwards, Contested Terrain: the Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century. New
York, NY: Basic Books, 1996, 58.
8 Ibid., 61.
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DuPont implemented old forms of organization and developed new forms of control after
a long succession fight in 1902. Since Eugene du Pont became president of the firm in 1889, the
company was authoritatively organized around two horizontal combinations: the Gunpowder
Trade Association and the Eastern Dynamite Company. 9 All of the major chemical companies -Du Pont, Laflin & Rand, and Hazard -- owned stock in the organization but did not oversee its
cumulative production. 10 After Eugene du Pont died from pneumonia in 1902, three du Pont
cousins -- Coleman, Alfred, and Pierre -- bought the firm for $15,360,000 in notes and stock
options. 11 Alfred and Coleman were trained engineers who managed the Johnson and Lorain
Steel company that built steel track and electric-powered equipment for street railways; they
adopted the most advanced administrative practices on the railroads and quickly integrated the
firm. 12 The three cousins, provoked by advances of scientific management, utilized new cost and
control systems to constantly run mills at full capacity. Under their leadership, DuPont became
the first modern corporation in the United States.
The cousins combined DuPont’s loose network of small firms under one corporate roof.
Alfred du Pont decided that buying competitors was too costly and requires the purchase of too
much unused plant capacity. So in 1903, DuPont merged the Gunpowder Trade Association and
the Eastern Dynamite Company. 13 The aim was to run the workers at maximum capacity and
achieve unit costs that industry competitors could not match. The merged firms required an
updated form of organization and control.

9

Alfred Dupont Chandler, The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge, MA:
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13 Ibid., 441.
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The advent of scientific management offered DuPont new ways to organize gunpowder
production around a system of managerial control. In the 1890’s, a young inventor and manager,
Frederick Winslow Taylor became a successful proponent of management derived out of
“science”, rather than personal relationships. 14 He diagnosed that the main problem of
production was “soldiering”, meaning the workers chose to produce less than their maximum
capacity. 15 Taylor attempted to compute the optimal time for industrial tasks by analyzing and
timing every action a worker performs inside a factory. 16 Systematic management was a
rebellion against tradition, empiricism, and the assumption that common sense, personal
relationships, and craft knowledge were sufficient to run a factory. The revisionists’ answer was
to replace traditional managers with engineers and to substitute managerial systems for ad hoc
evaluations. In 1901, Taylor argued that “What constituted a fair day’s work will be a question
for scientific investigation instead of a subject to be bargained and haggled over.” 17 While the
new ideology seldom had an effect on actual management, it changed the understanding of how
corporate resources can be applied to control all problems in a systematic way. DuPont managers
had drawn up a list of necessary lessons: control must come from a hierarchical structure, it must
be concerned with work itself, there must be positive rewards for proper work, and management
itself must be subject to systematic control. 18
DuPont set up new administrative departments to coordinate production throughout all of
the newly merged firms. More than one hundred firms were now run through three “operating

14

Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995, 36.
15 Edwards, Contested Terrain, 95.
16 Lamoreaux, Coordination and Information, 37.
17 Edwards, Contested Terrain, 90.
18 Ibid., 110.
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departments”: black powder, smokeless powder, and high explosives. 19 The firm set up
management headquarters along major product lines. Each department had their own vice
presidents, directors, staff, as well as control and accounting personnel. 20 Central offices
sharpened the distinction between ownership and management. The new managerial staff had no
stake in the firm and rarely visited any mills; they concerned themselves primarily with
improving worker efficiency. 21 This focus on scientific management expanded the size of whitecollar workers, drawing an imaginary line between factory employees and nonproduction
labor. 22 The expansion of nonproduction labor made workers a significant component of the
firm’s cost. Updated methods of productivity-accounting had to be developed under the auspice
of scientific management.
In 1903, Pierre du Pont pioneered a new method of industrial accounting that focused on
the rate of return on capital invested. Prior to the 20th century, most firms utilized renewal
accounting: earnings are calculated as a percentage of sales or costs. 23 Pierre argued that this
criterion was incomplete because it fails to indicate the rate of return on capital invested. Under
renewal accounting, a firm with low fixed costs and 10% profit would show higher return than a
commodity sold at double its cost in an expensive plant. Pierre changed this tradition by
calculating indirect costs of managers, foremen, and inspectors. 24 The accounting method
reflected the intensity of resources used rather than what they produced. Under the new model, if
costs can be kept constant, the rate of return on capital increased with throughput.

19

Chandler, The Visible Hand, 443.
Ibid., 444.
21 Ibid., 445.
22 Edwards, Contested Terrain, 89.
23 Chandler, The Visible Hand, 445.
24 Ibid., 445
20
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The updated organizational structure and increased capacity made DuPont the most
efficiently and effectively managed firm in the world. A managerial bureaucracy and accounting
focused on return on capital increased DuPont’s pace of accumulation. Within a generation,
DuPont’s managerial style became standard for the administration of all large-scale enterprises. 25
It allowed them to “efficiently” monitor production and distribute goods. The extra profits would
be reinvested in competing firms, and by 1911, DuPont owned the majority of the gunpowder
business. As the du Pont cousins expanded their rate of production and centralization, a vibrant
antitrust movement would turn the firm’s attention onto the national political sphere. This is
where the knot between capital and government would be tied.

Corporate America
From 1907 to 1918, the du Ponts would come to accept that the fate of their firm relied
on public opinion and national politics. The relationship between capitalists and regulators has
been altered by the capitalist’s dependence upon state regulation and economic stimulation. The
antitrust lawsuit filed against the firm would precipitate a staunch legal battle that would dissolve
a large portion of the enterprise. Simultaneously, World War I offered concrete proof of the
government’s ability to sustain and grow domestic industry. DuPont would work diligently to
make sure the government’s interests aligned with yearly profits. The historical association
between capitalism and democracy cannot be presumed to persist automatically. The du Pont
cousins became the most aggressive supporters of labor suppression, labor segmentation, and
social engineering.

25

Zilg, Du Pont, 125.
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DuPont’s first major corporate struggle against the government came as an antitrust suit.
In 1907, the Justice Department filed the first of a long series of antitrust suits against the
DuPont Company. This legal action was initiated by the Justice Department at the urging of the
Buckeye Powder Company. 26 Until then, the federal government had not interfered with Du
Pont's formidable market control. Despite DuPont pleading guilty to suppressing competition,
the firm was allowed to keep its monopoly on military munition. During the court hearings,
various high ranking military officials took stand in defending DuPont. The Chief of Navy
Ordnance, the chief of Army Ordnance, and a number of other generals testified that DuPont’s
monopoly on smokeless military powder was vital to national security. 27 Since the court could
not reverse the vertical integration of over sixty corporations, the judge asked DuPont to come up
with its own dissolution plan. The guilty were deciding their own punishment. In the end, the
firm was split up into three separate firms: DuPont, Atlas, and Hercules. 28 At each stage of the
case, DuPont sought to reduce sources of material and symbolic uncertainty imposed by the
State. The corporate lesson was simple: if the government wasn’t actively supportive, it was
hampering corporate performance.
World War I brought DuPont’s corporate interests in line with governmental objectives.
When war began in 1914, the federal government became incapable of producing sufficient
quantities of munition on its own. To make up the deficit, the military relied heavily on DuPont
as its chief supplier of explosives. 29 Before 1914, the Allies contracted DuPont for a total of
15,600,000 pounds of smokeless powder. Ten weeks later, the orders increased by over three

26

Ibid., 126.
Carr, The Du Ponts of Delaware, 224.
28 Ibid., 243.
29 Zilg, Du Pont, 158.
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hundred and fifty percent. 30 Only DuPont, with a hyper integrated supply chain could fulfill the
demand. The financial success from the war came with a halcyonic turn in public opinion.
The war provided a patriotic atmosphere within which DuPont could portray its
competition as traitorous. In 1915, Coleman du Pont established the infamous National Security
League to promote America’s entry into the war. 31 The league published vicious attacks on
congressmen who opposed entering the slaughter. Labor movements were similarly portrayed as
harmful to the war effort. Additional national interest forums like the National Civil Federation
brought labor leaders into a “responsible” relation with corporations, sometimes forcing
cooperation at literal gunpoint. The American Federation of Labor was forced to proclaim a ban
on strikes for the duration of the war. 32 Thus, the burden of suppressing labor shifted from
individual employers to agencies of the federal government. The war produced two effects of
lasting importance. First, DuPont established a secure position in the chemical industry. And
second, class conflict pushed corporations to link personal interests more closely to state power.
In general, DuPont went to great lengths in forcibly shaping class interests. A large
percentage of the American workforce were immigrants, making up an important pool of cheap
labor for industrial production. So when Coleman du Pont funded the American Association of
Foreign Language Newspapers, which acquired 400 foreign-language newspapers, the main goal
was promotion of “Americanism.” 33 The du Pont family also focused on breeding positive
business sentiment within the American born population. Coleman became the leading force in
creating the Boy Scouts of America. Early scout law required unyielding allegiance “to the

30

Carr, The Du Ponts of Delaware, 285.
Zilg, Du Pont, 152.
32 Edwards, Contested Terrain, 65.
33 Zilg, Du Pont, 169.
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President, and to his officers, and to his parents, his country, and his employer.” 34 To Coleman,
Americanism was capitalism and capitalism was DuPont.

Conclusion
Structural control and government collusion turned the conflict within the firm decisively
in DuPont’s favor. The early bond solidified during World War I shifted much of the corporate
struggle towards politics. When the working poor operated in the political arena to struggle for
their survival, they confronted capital. The structure of capital accumulation and breadth of
political resources has ensured that democratic rule is consistent with capitalist hegemony. As
the accumulation process expanded on global and scientific dimensions, the prospects for
successful accumulation became increasingly dependent on state support. As the antitrust
movements have demonstrated, controlling the state has become both more essential and more
precarious than ever.
History of DuPont’s modernization can serve both to understand and challenge labor
suppression across the country. It was primarily through a concerted division of administrative
labor that corporatization came on to take a distinctly American flavor. Eventually, global wars
became the stimulus that brought monopoly leaders out of courtrooms and into war rooms,
becoming both the cause and the profiteer of international slaughter. American corporations as
we know them came to be on the backs of labor unions, soldiers, and pliant politicians. A serious
project of social reform is required to make sure the mistakes of the early 20th century are not
repeated.

34

Ibid., 169.
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